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Li Chen, Guowei Zhu, Qi Li, Haifeng Li, Member, IEEE
Abstract—With the wide application of remote sensing tech-
nology in various fields, the accuracy and security requirements
for remote sensing images (RSIs) recognition are also increasing.
In recent years, due to the rapid development of deep learning in
the field of image recognition, RSI recognition models based on
deep convolution neural networks (CNNs) outperform traditional
hand-craft feature techniques. However, CNNs also pose security
issues when they show their capability of accurate classification.
By adding a very small variation of the adversarial perturbation
to the input image, the CNN model can be caused to produce
erroneous results with extremely high confidence, and the mod-
ification of the image is not perceived by the human eye. This
added adversarial perturbation image is called an adversarial
example, which poses a serious security problem for systems
based on CNN model recognition results. This paper, for the first
time, analyzes adversarial example problem of RSI recognition
under CNN models. In the experiments, we used different attack
algorithms to fool multiple high-accuracy RSI recognition models
trained on multiple RSI datasets. The results show that RSI
recognition models are also vulnerable to adversarial examples,
and the models with different structures trained on the same RSI
dataset also have different vulnerabilities. For each RSI dataset,
the number of features also affects the vulnerability of the model.
Many features are good for defensive adversarial examples.
Further, we find that the attacked class of RSI has an attack
selectivity property. The misclassification of adversarial examples
of the RSIs are related to the similarity of the original classes in
the CNN feature space. In addition, adversarial examples in RSI
recognition are of great significance for the security of remote
sensing applications, showing a huge potential for future research.
Index Terms—Remote sensing image, deep learning, convolu-
tion neural network, adversarial example
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the substantial progress of remote sensing tech-nology, the automatic interpretation of remote sensing
images (RSIs) has greatly improved [1]. RSIs with higher
resolution lead to the wide use of RSI recognition system in
crop classification [2], forest resource survey [3], land cover
classification [4], building detection and other fields [5]. The
automatic interpretation of RSIs with robust and high accuracy
can bring huge economic efficiency.
The performance of image recognition, which is the first
step in RSI recognition system, is especially important. A good
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Fig. 1. On the left is the original airplane. The RSI recognition system can
correctly classify it as an airplane with a confidence of 99.81%. However, after
adding an adversarial perturbation to the image, the RSI recognition system
can recognize it as a beach with 99.87% confidence. The result is wrong, and
we call the modified image an adversarial example. Obviously, the adversarial
example cannot affect human recognition, but it leads to system errors and
has serious consequences.
image recognition algorithm can extract target features effec-
tively and quickly locate new targets. In the past, we first used
feature extraction algorithm, such as HOG [6] and SIFT [7],
to obtain feature vectors of RSI. Then, we reorganize these
features and input them into an SVM classifier [8]. However,
most of these algorithms have low recognition accuracy with
much computational cost, which makes it difficult to meet the
requirements of practical application.
In recent years, deep learning has achieved remarkable
progress in the fields of computer vision [9]. Intuitively,
many excellent algorithms, especially deep convolution neural
networks (CNNs), have been introduced to RSI recognition
system [2], [4], [5]. Chen et al. [10] used a single-layer
AE and multi-layer SAE to learn the features of RSIs, and
proposed a classification method based on extracted spatial-
dominated features. This method performs better than SVM
and KNN classification models. Chen et al. [11] proposed a
DBN-based image classification framework, which combined
the spectral and spatial features of RSIs. He used a CNN
model to extract robust features from images and therefore
greatly reduced the number of hyperparameters. To alleviate
the over-fitting problem of CNNs, Cheng et al. [12] added the
metric learning regular term to the CNN model by optimizing
the discriminant objective function. It efficiently reduced the
classification error. Zhang et al. [13] proposed a Gradient-
Boosting Random Convolution Network which reused the
weight of each CNN model and reduced parameters, making
the feature extraction more efficient. Chaib et al. [14] used the
CNN model for feature extraction and discriminant correlation
analysis (DCA) for data fusion. These RSI recognition models
perform much better in accuracy than traditional RSIs pattern
recognition. These methods solve the problem of low accuracy
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and efficiency of RSI recognition, which benefits from not only
the rich remote sensing data but also the increasing computing
power. Importantly, these improvements are inseparable from
the excellent feature extraction ability of CNNs.
However, CNNs also have many problems that are difficult
to solve, especially security problems [15]. Szegedy [16]
found that with the gradient algorithm, a small adversarial
perturbation can be achieved on the trained model. When the
input image adds this noise, the CNN model can recognize the
successfully classified image as another class with high con-
fidence. We call the modified image an adversarial example.
The problem of adversarial examples exists in various
application areas of deep learning [17]. RSI recognition al-
gorithms based on CNNs are also troubled by the problem of
adversarial examples. For the classification problem of RSIs,
especially those in the military field and automatic driving,
it is a great security risk. The consequences can be very
serious. As shown in Figure 1, in the military field, an attacker
can generate adversarial perturbation for a target such as an
airplane, and camouflage the object through a physical object.
The adversarial example of the target object can easily avoid
the detection of the military target detection system. This
allows the originally robust target to be identified as another
target with extremely high confidence. Current excellent RSI
recognition systems often depend on CNNs to extract features
from the target. And unlike natural images, RSIs have their
unique properties, such as spectra, bands, and so on. Besides,
RSIs are usually shot from a top view angle, without the
foreground and back view of natural images. Therefore, it is
necessary to study the characteristics of adversarial examples
in RSI recognition system.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first time to
explore adversarial examples of RSIs. In the experiment, we
trained several basic CNN models with the widest application
in RSI recognition system. In these high accuracy CNNs,
we use a variety of attack algorithms to generate different
adversarial examples. The results of the experiment show that
the problem of adversarial examples does exist in the field of
RSI recognition, and high accuracy CNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial examples.
Furthermore, we find that the fundamental issues on adver-
sarial examples of RSIs: model vulnerability and attack selec-
tivity. Model vulnerability means that different RSI recognition
CNNs have different security characters. They need different
costs to obtain adversarial examples. The difficulty of attack
is related to the model structure and the training data. Attack
selectivity property shows that the error classes of adversarial
examples are generally concentrated. The misclassification of
adversarial examples is highly similar to the correct original
scene. These properties also reflect the characteristics of
adversarial examples in RSI recognition.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• For the first time, we analyze adversarial example prob-
lem of RSI recognition. The CNN models of RSI recog-
nition are also vulnerable on adversarial examples. This
is a new problem worth exploring.
• The vulnerability of the model to adversarial examples
is also related to its model structure and the RSI dataset.
Models with multi-scale features and datasets with rich
features can effectively reduce the attack threat of adver-
sarial examples.
• We find that adversarial example of RSI has an attack
selectivity property. The result of adversarial example
problem is close to the class with similar features in the
CNN feature space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections II
introduces the research progress of adversarial examples. We
explain the concept of CNN, the model structure, and the
principles and algorithms of the attack algorithm in section
III. Section IV is the experimental setup and results analysis.
In section V, we present conclusions and discussions.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, CNNs have been used in many tasks in the
field of remote sensing, such as landmark recognition [18],
land use classification [19], and change detection [20]. CNNs
have shown outstanding results in these areas. However, most
of the research focuses on how to improve accuracy and
design a good CNN structure [21]–[23]. There is insufficient
attention to adversarial example problem of RSI recognition
system. Since adversarial example was proposed by Szegedy
et al. [16], the security of deep learning has caused widespread
discussion.
Adversarial example refers to the input image formed by
adding a special adversarial perturbation, which results in the
model giving a false output with high confidence. Generally,
the small adversarial perturbation is not perceived by the
human eye. Goodfellow [24] pointed that adversarial examples
of CNNs are due to the linear operations of the model in
a high dimensional space. For feature vector operations in
a high dimensional space, the small perturbations can cause
great errors. Adversarial examples reduce the robustness of
the model. It not only is a problem of computer vision
tasks, but also exists in many fields such as natural language
processing and sentiment analysis [25]. We know that RSIs are
high dimensional data. Intuitively, the problem of adversarial
examples in RSI recognition system is unavoidable.
What’s more, the attack algorithms of adversarial examples
are also diverse. Goodfellow [24] proposed the Fast Gradient
Notation (FGSM) method. It first computes the gradient direc-
tion of the model loss function, and then increases the value of
the loss function by adding a small adversarial perturbation in
the direction. Thus, the prediction result of the model deviates
from the real class of RSI. This attack algorithm is simple,
but the fooling rate of the model being deceived is low.
Therefore, Kurakin et al. proposed a basic iterative method
(BIM) [26]. The algorithm is an extension to the FGSM. With
multiple iterations, it tries to add a noise in each step to
increase the value of the loss. By each iteration, the image
pixels changed are controlled within a certain neighborhood
of the original picture. The BIM algorithm can effectively
improve the fooling rate of attacks. Additionally, to reduce
adversarial perturbation. Su et al. [27] proposed a single pixel
attack method, which only needs to change one pixel of the
original image to cause the misclassification of the classifier.
The results are impressive.
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Attack algorithms are also divided into multiple types.
According to information acquisition by the attacker on the
model, attack algorithms can be divided into a white box
attack and a black box attack [15]. In a white box attack, the
attacker knows the type of CNN, the number of layers, and
the optimization method for training. They can get the training
data and even know the hyperparameters of the model. Attack-
ers can launch more targeted attacks based on model details.
Contrary to white-box attacks, attackers in black box attacks
are unaware of model details. They can only use the model
application background and the model’s outputs to analyze the
vulnerability of the model. According to the characteristics
of the attack algorithm, Biggio et al. [28], [29] classify the
attack scenario into three categories: evasive attack, poisoned
attack and exploratory attack. The attacker in the evasive attack
scenario attempts to avoid the detection of the system by
constructing malicious input. This is the most common type
of attack. In this scenario, the attacker cannot influence the
training data of the model. The attacker in the poisoned attack
scenario attempts to inject the constructed malicious data to
poison the model during training process. In the exploratory
attack scenario, the attacker cannot affect the training dataset
or the details of the model. It acquires knowledge about
learning algorithms and training data by testing the response
of the model to the input data, thereby constructing effective
adversarial examples. According to whether the attack class
is clear, the types of attack algorithms are also divided into
targeted attacks and untargeted attacks [15]. Targeted attacks
attempt to make the model classify the adversarial example as
a specific class, while untargeted attacks do not care about the
prediction labels of adversarial examples. Untargeted attacks
only require the model to misclassify the data that were
originally correctly classified.
Above all, adversarial example attacks may occur during
the training and testing of the model. The type of attacker
is related to model details and training data. When the deep
learning system exposes a lot of information to the attacker,
the model can be more vulnerable.
Nowadays, RSI recognition has many CNN-based appli-
cations. They may also have adversarial example problems.
These problems will have very serious consequences for the
application of RSI recognition results. Moreover, RSIs have
spatial and spectral properties. RSIs are different from the
natural images. Therefore, it is of great significance to study
adversarial example problem of RSI recognition.
III. METHOD
This section introduces CNN briefly, and the most widely
used robust CNN model structure in RSI recognition. Subse-
quently, we explain how to use attack algorithms to generate
adversarial example of RSI.
Definition 1: We denote the input RSIs D = {xn, yn},
where xn represents the input n RSI, and yn represents the
class of n RSI. We define the RSI recognition system as
f(x). Generally, we can get f(x) = y. The system can
correctly recognize the input x. We define ρ as the adversarial
perturbation. The adversarial example problem of RSIs can be
represented as follows:
f(x+ ρ) 6= y s.t. min
ρ
||ρ||, (1)
where minρ ||ρ|| denotes the regularization constraint on
the adversarial perturbation. It ensures that the change of
perturbation is small. After adding the adversarial perturbation,
the modified RSI can cause the original correct result to be
incorrect. We call this the adversarial example problem of RSI
recognition.
A. Convolution neural networks
The current RSI recognition systems have better recog-
nition capabilities, and they are mostly based on CNNs.
CNNs usually consist of convolutional layers, pooling layers,
and fully-connected layers [30]. Each layer has a different
function. There are multiple sets of alternate convolutional
and pooling layers in the model, as shown in Figure 2. C
represents the convolutional layers, P represents the pooling
layer, and F represents the fully-connected layer. Through
these structures, RSIs are continuously reduced in dimension,
and semantic features are gradually abstracted. Eventually, the
model implements the classification of the RSIs. We denote
Θ = {W l, bl} to represent the parameters of the model, W l
and bl to represent the weights and biases of the convolution
kernel on the l layer. The feedforward operation of model can
be as follows,
Al(X) = fp(fa(W
l ∗Al−1(X) + bl)), (2)
Where ∗ denotes convolutional operations. fa is an acti-
vation function, mainly including ReLu, pRelu, etc [31]. fp
represents pooling operations, including maximum and aver-
age pooling. Pooling operations can reduce the dimension of
the RSI. It cannot only reduce the computational complexity,
but also improve the generalization ability of the model. Al
denotes the feature maps after the convolution and pooling
operations.
When the feature maps are fed into the fully-connection
layer, all the feature maps need to be flattened and trans-
formed into vectors. Finally, the multi-classifier software can
predict a class depending on the final outputs. When the
prediction is not correct, we use cross-entropy loss function
to compute the distance between the predicted results and the
real labels. Then, the model can update by backpropagation
algorithm [30]. It helps the model to reduce the loss value.
The model converges gradually in the process of iteration.
The optimization of the model is shown as following.
Θ∗ = arg min J(Θ;D). (3)
J(Θ) represents the empirical loss function, and Θ∗ repre-
sents the weight of the model after convergence. The trained
model also performs well on the new RSI dataset and has good
ability of generalization.
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C: Convolutional Layer
Convolutional KernelP: Pooling Layer
F: Fully-connected Layer
Fig. 2. The basic convolution neural network. It includes input data, alternate convolution layer and pooling layer, fully-connected layer and classifier. The
input image is extracted by convolution kernel, and the final feature vector of the input image is fed to the classifier. The classifier can recognize the image.
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Fig. 3. The model structure of InceptionV1. (a) is an inception module.
It is composed of several branches and the different size of convolutional
kernels. The results of all branches are concatenated together in dimensions.
It can extract features of different scales, which is beneficial to improve the
classification accuracy. (b) is the structure of InceptionV1 model. It consists
of multiple inception modules and contains three loss functions. Before the
fully-connected layer, it uses the global average pooling to reduce parameters.
The whole model has high accuracy, few parameters and low computation.
Convolutional Layer
Convolutional Layer
+
(a) Residual mod-
ule
(b) ResNet
Fig. 4. The model structure of ResNet. (a) is a residual module. It is
implemented by a shortcut connection. The input and output of this module are
added by shortcut. Without adding additional parameters, the training speed
of the model can be greatly increased. (b) is the structure of ResNet model.
It contains multiple residual modules. These modules make the model deeper
and help solve the problems of vanishing gradient and exploding gradient.
1) Inception: The outstanding model structure has made
an important contribution to the success of CNN. The model
structure has evolved from the AlexNet [32] to several superior
structures. As shown in Figure 3(b), InceptionV1 [33] is
the champion model of the 2014 ILSVRC classification and
detection competition [34], known as GoogleNet.
In the inception model structure, it introduces an inception
module, as shown in Figure 3(a). Through the inception
module, convolution operations are performed by multiple sets
of convolution kernels of different scales, 3×3 and 1×1, and
finally the results of different scales are stacked to form a new
multi-channel data to the next inception module.
On the fully-connected layer, to reduce the parameter num-
ber, InceptionV1 also performs a new global average pooling
operation (GAP). It does not need to flatten the feature maps,
but instead uses a pool-like operation to turn the entire feature
map into a single value. All feature maps are constructed
as a feature vector to complete the remaining operations
of the model. Additionally, it designs some auxiliary loss
functions arranged on different layers. These losses are open
during training and are closed at the time of testing. They
can optimize the model. All these excellent designs not only
improve the overall accuracy, but also make the InceptionV1
applied to many fields and become one of the most famous
model structures. It has a very good effect on RSI recognition.
2) ResNet: Another model structure, ResNet [35], won
the 2015 ILSVRC competition, as shown in Figure 4(b).
The model took the depth to the extreme, and for the first
time the model achieved a depth of 152 layers. ResNet50 is
the 50 layers version of ResNet. To train deeper structures,
ResNet introduced a residual module, as shown in Figure 4(a).
It implements the delivery of information between layers
through a shortcut connection. Without adding parameters,
it can directly put the shallow features into the upper layer,
greatly increasing the training speed of the model. ResNet
has achieved a milestone on ImageNet competition [34]. It
is the first model to surpass human recognition on ImageNet
classification task. Moreover, ResNet, as the main backbone
of the detection model, has achieved good results in VOC Pas-
cal [36], COCO [37] datasets and other detection tasks [38].
Many RSI detection applications are based on ResNet [39].
B. Attack algorithm
These excellent models still can’t escape from the problem
of adversarial examples. The goal of adversarial example is
mostly to make the model misclassify the minimally changed
image where the original image can be classified correctly. The
attack algorithms of adversarial examples are also applicable
to RSIs.
1) Fast Gradient Sign Method: Goodfellow [24] developed
an effective white box attack algorithm, FGSM, based on
gradients. The idea is to attack the model based on the
gradient direction of the model loss function. When the model
converges, the weights are fixed. By computing the partial
derivative of the input image through the loss function, we
can obtain the optimal change direction of the input image,
thereby reducing the value of loss. The FGSM algorithm does
the opposite. It adds a minimal perturbation to the input image
that is opposite to the optimal direction, thereby increasing the
value of the loss function. It causes the model to misclassify
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TABLE I
DETAILS OF DATASETS
Datasets Scene class Sizes Total Train Test Samples
UCM
21 (agricultural, airplane, baseballdiamond, beach,
buildings, chaparral, denseresidential, forest, freeway, golfcourse, harbor,
intersection, mediumresidential, mobilehomepark, overpass, parkinglot, river,
runway, sparseresidential, storagetanks and tenniscourt.)
256×256 1,680 1,345 335
NWPU
45 (airplane, airport, baseball diamond, basketball
court, beach, bridge, chaparral, church, circular farmland, cloud, commercial
area, dense residential, desert, forest, freeway, golf course, ground track
field, harbor, industrial area, intersection, island, lake, meadow, medium
residential, mobile home park, mountain, overpass, palace, parking lot,
railway, railway station, rectangular farmland, river, roundabout, runway,
seaice, ship, snowberg, sparse residential, stadium, storage tank, tennis
court, terrace, thermal power station, and wetland.)
256×256 25,200 20,160 5,040
CLRS
20 (airport, bare-land, beach, bridge, commercial, desert,
farmland, forest, golf-course, highway, industrial, meadow,
mountain, overpass, park, parking, playground, port, railway,
railway-station, residential, river, runway, stadium and storage-tank.)
256×256 12,000 9,600 2,400
the input image. We denote x to represents the original RSI,
xadv to represents adversarial image of RSI by the attack
algorithm. J(θ, x, y) is the model loss function, where θ is
the weights of the RSI classification model. The FGSM attack
algorithm is as follows:
Xadv = X + sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), (4)
∇ represents the partial derivative of the loss function, that
is, the optimal direction of the input image. The sign function
guarantees the same direction as the optimal change that can
increases the loss value. Then it multiplies a small positive
integer , so that the model is finally misclassified. To constrain
the adversarial perturbation of the attack algorithm, FGSM
uses L∞ to ensure that the noise changes are small enough.
The resulting xadv is an adversarial example of RSI x. xadv
usually is not noticed by the human eye. It should not cause
the model to change dramatically. However, according to the
characteristics of the adversarial perturbation, the added noise
increases loss value, and the model misclassifies xadv with
high confidence. The FGSM attack algorithm is a change in
the optimization direction, which we also call a one-step attack
algorithm. The one-step attack algorithm mainly makes the
loss larger to deceive the model.
2) Basic Iterative Methods: To increase the change of
the loss, the iteratively updated multi-step attack algorithm
BIM [26] is also proposed. We know that CNN is not a linear
model, and the optimal direction of change of the model will
change with the input variables. Therefore, each iteration re-
updates the optimization direction to get a better attack effect.
BIM can be represented as follows,
Xi+1 = Clip{Xi + sign(∇XJ(θ, x, y)} (5)
i represents the adversarial perturbation of the i iteration,
and Clip represents that the modified image is limited to a
certain range. This attack algorithm is slower than FGSM,
but it is more effective. Adversarial examples after multiple
iterations are easier to deceive the model.
3) Fooling Rate: To evaluate the effect of attack algorithms,
we introduce the definition of the fooling rate. It shows the
ratio of the model’s misclassified images to the attack images,
which can be represented as follows
fooling rate =
# misclassification images
# attack images
, (6)
where #misclassificationimages represent the num-
ber of misclassified images after being attacked. Similarly,
#attackimages represent the number of images attacked.
Through the fooling rate, we can evaluate the impact of the
attack algorithms on model recognition under the dataset.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we use FGSM and BIM algorithms to attack
multiple converged RSI recognition models under different
datasets. Then, we analyze the impact of different attack
algorithms on the model.
A. Experimental setup
The attack object of adversarial example is a model with
high accuracy that has been converged. In the experiment, we
use three commonly used RSI datasets including: UC Merced
Land Use [40], NWPU-RESISC45 [41], CLRS [42].
The UC Merced Land Use Dataset (UCM) has 21 land-
use classes, each of which includes 100 256×256 images.
All images are extracted from the National Map Urban Area
Imagery collection, including multiple towns across the United
States. The resolution of the images is 1 foot.
NWPU-RESISC45 (NWPU) is a RSI scene classification
benchmark data. The dataset includes 31,500 images, covering
45 classes of scenes, and each class has 700 images. The
images have a resolution of 256×256.
CLRS is a RSI scene classification dataset that can be used
to evaluate RSI scene classification algorithms. It includes 25
classes, each of which has 600 256×256 images with a total
of 15,000 images. For all datasets, we choose 80% of them as
a training set, and the remaining 20% as a test set during the
training progress. The detail of dataset is shown in Table I.
For deep learning models, we choose InceptionV1 and
ResNet50, which are widely used in the RSI recognition
system. The experimental platform is based on Ubuntu 16.04,
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TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF MODELS
datasets models train accuracy test accuracy
UCM InceptionV1 99.45% 71.73%ResNet50 100% 78.52%
NWPU InceptionV1 99.52% 86.71%ResNet50 100% 89.62%
CLRS InceptionV1 100% 81.17%ResNet50 100% 84.24%
12×3.20GHz Core i7 CPU, NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti GPU, and
TensorFlow framework [43]. When training the model, we
fine-tune the weights on three RSI training datasets based on
the pre-trained InceptionV1 and Resnet50 models, and obtain
6 RSI recognition models. Their classification accuracy of the
models on the training set and test set is shown in the Table II.
The recognition results of the models sometimes are false
when they are not attacked. It is meaningless to discuss adver-
sarial example in the case of image misclassification by CNN
model. Therefore, in this experiment, only when the model
classifies the original image correctly, and the classification
confidence of the original image and the misclassification
confidence of adversarial examples are greater than 0.7, the
attack is successful. We use the FGSM and BIM algorithms
to attack this 6 RSI recognition models.
B. Model vulnerability of RSIs
Through the two attack algorithms FGSM and BIM, we
find that adversarial examples are common in RSI recognition
tasks. In the experiment, regardless of the training dataset and
the network structures, the model vulnerability is demonstrated
after the attack, that is, the image is misclassified with high
confidence.
The attack results are shown in Figure 5. The original classi-
fication of RSI is correct and the confidence is more than 90%.
After the attack, we can hardly tell the difference between the
adversarial example and the original input image, while RSI
recognition model misclassifies adversarial examples.
Further, we find that different attack methods can bring
different effects. Table III shows the fooling rates of 6 RSI
recognition models using two attack algorithms.
Under the two attack methods, the fooling rate of the
ResNet50 model trained in the UCM dataset is higher than
80%, and the attack fooling rate of the ResNet50 model trained
by NWPU and CLRS is more than 15%. The fooling rate of
the InceptionV1 model is relatively low. The fooling rate of
the BIM attack algorithm is slightly higher than that of the
FGSM attack algorithm. The model vulnerability to adversarial
example is multifactorial. These factors can be divided into
two aspects: model vulnerability and attack characteristics.
1) Impact of the RSI model: For model vulnerability, we
believe that the RSI recognition model structure is the first
factor that can affect adversarial examples. Therefore, we
calculated adversarial examples obtained by all models in each
class, as shown in Figure 6. We find that the differences in
model structure have a large impact on adversarial exam-
ples. Model structure is one of the factors that influence the
model vulnerability. For the InceptionV1 and ResNet50 RSI
TABLE III
FOOLING RATE OF ATTACK ALGORITHMS TO MODELS
datasets models attackalgorithms
# adversarial
examples
fooling
rate
UCM
InceptionV1 FGSM 0 0.00%BIM 13 0.77%
ResNet50 FGSM 1449 86.30%BIM 1450 86.31%
NWPU
InceptionV1 FGSM 28 0.37%BIM 94 11.11%
ResNet50 FGSM 3608 14.31%BIM 3608 14.31%
CLRS
InceptionV1 FGSM 56 0.46%BIM 130 1.08%
ResNet50 FGSM 1927 16.05%BIM 1933 16.10%
recognition models, the attack fooling rate of the InceptionV1
model is less than 5%, which is much lower than the attack
fooling rate of the ResNet50 model. By counting the error
classes of adversarial examples after successful attack, for
InceptionV1, the classes of misclassification are concentrated
in few classes. The distribution of misclassified classes of
adversarial examples represents a long tail distribution. For
the ResNet50 recognition model, adversarial examples are
obtained in each class, and the number is relatively balanced.
Only a few classes have fewer adversarial example. We hold
that the features of images in different ways of different model
structures affect the model vulnerability of the RSI system.
2) Impact of the RSI dataset: We find that the difference
of training datasets also affect the model vulnerability of RSI
recognition system. From Table III, the fooling rates of two
attack models for CNN models trained on UCM datasets are
over 80%, while the fooling rates of CNN models trained on
NWPU and CLRS datasets are less than 20%. This is mainly
determined by the number of features in the training dataset.
UCM dataset has 21 classes, the total number of images is
2100. NWPU and CLRS have 45 and 25 classes, respectively,
and the total numbers of images are 31.500 and 15,000, which
are more substantial than UCM. When datasets have more
features. These features are beneficial to defensive adversarial
examples.
In high-dimensional space, small perturbations can make it
difficult for features to cross the classification boundary. When
training datasets involve fewer classes, their classification
boundary is close to each class, and the modified images
can easily lead to the features from one class to another,
that is, the model is vulnerable to adversarial example. We
validate this view by reducing the dimensionality of the
features of the RSIs. First, we extract the feature vectors of
the last fully-connected layer of the InceptionV1 and ResNet50
models. Then, all feature vectors are embedded into the low-
dimensional space by t-SNE [44] visualization, which is a
method for mapping multi-dimensional data to two or more
dimensions suitable for observation. The close distance of data
in low-dimensional space means that the similarity between
data is higher.
As shown in Figure 7, the datasets are different in embed-
ding space of different models. The data of UCM is sparse,
and the classification distance between different features is
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Fig. 5. A demonstration of adversarial examples. Under different datasets, models and attack algorithms, we show adversarial examples of attacked RSIs. Each
group is represented in pairs. The upper image represents the original input image, and the lower image represents the corresponding adversarial example.
We can find that the classes of the adversarial examples are misclassified.
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Fig. 6. The distribution of the model’s misclassification results of adversarial examples. We find that the distribution of results is different. The results of the
InceptionV1 represent a long tail distribution, while the results of ResNet50 represent a uniform distribution.
close. On the contrary, for the NWPU and CLRS datasets,
they have a mount of data, and data points mix between
several classes. From Table III, the fooling rate on the UCM
is high. This shows that the adversarial example affects the
change of the data on the classification boundary. This change
leads to image from one class to another. For a rich feature
dataset, many features make the recognition result secure, so
a small perturbation cannot affect the final recognition result.
Comparing to Table III, we also know that the adversarial
example problem on ResNet is more serious. From Figure 7,
the classification boundaries under ResNet are distinct, but this
leads to more adversarial examples. Above all, the adversarial
example problem of a simple dataset is serious. The dataset is
also one of the factors that affect adversarial examples.
C. Attack selectivity of RSIs
After the attack, the class of RSI object is likely to be
misclassified into few specific classes by the model. We call
it attack selectivity on RSI images. Intuitively, in the high-
dimensional feature space, When the FGSM and BIM attack
algorithms add adversarial perturbations to RSIs, the features
of adversarial example are close to the features of misclas-
sification class. Therefore, when the attack is successful, the
classes of adversarial examples are to be in the classes of those
original features in the feature space. Among all data points,
points near the classification boundary are most susceptible to
adversarial perturbation.
We find that RSI classes with similar features in low-
dimensional space are more likely to be classes of adversarial
examples when attacked. To verify that the classes with similar
features are more likely to be the classes of adversarial
examples, we use the RSI features of the last fully-connected
layer of the CNN model, and compute the L2 distance between
various RSIs and various cluster centers from the t-SNE
algorithm.
We demonstrate several adversarial examples of ResNet50
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Fig. 7. Low-dimensional embedding of datasets under different models.
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Fig. 8. A demonstration of attack selectivity, under the UCM dataset. The histogram represents the distance from the top 5 classes of other class cluster
centers. The pie chart represents the distribution of adversarial examples obtained on this category. The classes of adversarial examples are below the dotted
line. The adversarial classes are close to the classes in the embedding space.
in the UCM dataset, as shown in Figure 8. The histogram
shows the top five classes in the low-dimensional embedding
space. From the Figure 8, the classes of adversarial examples
by the two attack algorithms are mostly concentrated in several
specific classes. And these classes are among the five classes.
The adversarial classes are related to the representations of the
model in the feature space. The model relies on features when
inferencing new RSIs. The adversarial perturbation changes
the class of the input RSI. On the other hand, we also constrain
the changes of the adversarial perturbation so that the RSI can
only move a small amount of distance. This makes the moved
class close to the original class. Thus, adversarial examples
of RSIs are concentrated in few classes. This characteristic is
called the attack selectivity.
D. Experiment discussion
In this experiment, we verified that adversarial examples
also exist in RSI recognition systems. We find that the use of
different scale training datasets and different model structures
have an impact on model vulnerability. Even the same model
exhibits different model vulnerabilities for different attack
algorithms. However, when measuring the difference between
the adversarial example class and the original class, we do not
consider the shape of the cluster and quantitatively calculate
the orientation of the RSI feature transfer, and does not discuss
in detail how to defend adversarial example in RSI recognition
system.
Adversarial examples of RSIs also have attack selectivity.
From a geometric point of view, the RSI dataset is represented
as a data point in the high-dimensional space in the CNN
model, and adversarial example is deviated from the boundary
of the original cluster by adding small perturbations to the
data points. It causes models to misclassify them. Therefore,
data points at the cluster boundary are more likely to be
successfully attacked than data points near the center of
the cluster. Meanwhile, we find that most of the adversarial
classes are beach. Beaches may have special characteristics.
We believe that this research can provide some ideas for the
future research on the security and the defense methods on
adversarial examples of the RSI recognition system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, for the first time, we discuss adversarial
example problem in RSI recognition. From the experiment,
it shows the adversarial examples are difficult for the human
eye to recognize. They allow the RSI recognition system
achieve the false results. This can cause serious problems
for applications based on RSI recognition systems. Through
our experiment results, we propose two properties such as
model vulnerability and attack selectivity to discuss adversarial
example on RSI. We find that adversarial examples of RSIs
are related to the similarity between classes. For classes with
higher similarity in feature space, it is easier for them to
generate corresponding adversarial examples. This provides an
important idea to further design the defense mechanism.
Adversarial examples in the field of RSI can be a problem
that should be paid attention to. In the field of RSI applications,
there are still many detection and segmentation tasks, such as
building detection, land cover classification, etc. The process-
ing of these tasks is different from the image classification.
The adversarial example problem of these tasks need further
study. This is of great significance to design a secure and
robust CNN-based remote sensing application system.
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